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To establish an effective program of banking supervision and
prudential regulation, the public policy role of bank supervision
must be clearly defined and understood and actions taken along
several parallel tracks to strengthen the bank supervisory proc-
ess, the legal  framework, accounting and auditing, and  the
institutions themselves.
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Economic deregulation and financial liberaliza-  its customers.  Satisfactory accounting and au-
tior. are important for a country to develop a  diting standards are also crucial to ensure that
viable and robust financial system. But deregu-  financial statements adequately reflect each
lation will remove the protections previously  tinancial institution's condition.
afforded the banking system.  Increased compe-
tition, a changing price structure, new market  Different countries have adopted different
entrants, and other factors will increase the risks  models of bank regulation and supervision.  In
banks assume and the instability of the financial  some cases, the basis is consultation and moral
system. The failure of a large bank or multiple  suasion, in others, "hands-on" verification
bank failures may force a sudden contraction of  through on-site inspection.  Organizational ap-
the money supply, a failure of the payments  proaches also vary from country to country.  But
system, a severe dislocation of the real economy,  no model will be effective if significant political
and real or implicit obligations on the part of the  interference is permitted.
government.
The primary line of defense against banking
So, the government's goal to ensure the  insolvency and financial system distress is the
stability of the financial system is of paramount  quality and character of management within the
importance.  Prudential regulation and supervi-  banks themselves. Therefore, efforts to
sion are designed to remove or lessen the threat  strengthen the financial system must also focus
of systemic instability.  In addition, the safety  on strengthlening  management and management
and soundness of the banking system must be  systems through a process of institutional
supported by an adequate legal framework  development.
goveming a bank's contractual relationship with
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Produced at the PPR Dissemination  CenterESTABLISHING  A SOUND  PUBLIC  POLICY  FOR BANKS
Banks'  hold a unique position  in most economies  as creators  of money, the
principal  depositories  of  the  public's  financial  savings,  the  primary  allocators
of credit,  and managers  of the country's  payment  systems.  For this reason,
governments  establish  public  policy  for  banks  in the  public  interest.  In  most
market  economies,  the  goals  of  these  policies  are  to  control  the  supply  of  money,
prevent systemic financial instability,  and meliorate concerns about the
efficiency  and  equity  of financial  intermediation.  In  socialized,  or  centrally-
planned  economies,  public  policy  for  banks  may differ  --  emphasizing  instead,
the  role  of the  banking  system  in channeling  funds  to priority  sectors  of the
economy.
Because  banks  perform  an intermediary  function  as gatherers  of deposits  and
allocators  of  credit, they are necessarily  highly leveraged  making them
vulnerable  to  depositor  withdrawals  and  losses  of  public  confidence.  Since  most
banking  assets  are  usually  held as loans  and  advances  which  cannot  be easily
valued,  there  is  a lack  of transparency  as to  the  actual  financial  condition  of
any  given  bank.  This lack  of transparency  further  adds  to the  vulnerability  of
banks since depositors  may be forced  to act upon incomplete  or inaccurate
information  and  rumors  concerning  the  health  of such  institutions.
From a public policy perspective, 2 the government's  goal to ensure the
stability  of the  financial  system  should  be of  paramount  importance.  The  failure
of a large  bank  or  multiple  bank failures  may  force  a sudden  contraction  of the
money  supply,  a  failure  of the  payments  system,  a  severe  dislocation  of  the  real
economy,  and  real or implicit  obligations  on the  part of the  government.  The
failire  of any bank,  no matter  how small,  may lead to contagion  and loss  of
concidence  in  the  system,  unless  the  government  can  demonstratr  its  ability  to
handle  bank failures  in  an orderly  and  systematic  fashion.
Public  policy  towards  banks  is  captured  or  codified  in  the  various  laws,  rules,
and regulations  issued  by  governments.  These may  generally  be  classified
according  to  their  intent  as  e;.ther  economic 3 or  prudential 4 regulation,  although
1 The  term  "bank"  is  used  in  this  paper  as  a  generic  term  covering  all  types
of deposit  and credit  institutions  (commercial  and savings  banks  as well as
building  societies,  savings  and  loan  associations  and  credit  unions).
2  For more on prudential  supervision  as an aspect  of public  policy,  see
Robert  R. Bench:  "International  Lending  Supervision"  mimeo.
3  Economic  regulation  refers  to regulation  designed  to achieve  economic
goals. Examples include  reserve requirements  (control  of money creation),
directed  credit and credit allocation  (lending  to priority  sectors in the
interest  of social  and  developmental  objectives),  financial  taansaction  taxes
(revenue  generation  for  the  fiscal  budget),  etc.
1in  some  instances  regulation  has  both  economic  and  prudential  aspects.  This  paper
will primarily  concern  itself  with the prudential  aspects  of regulation  and
supervision  which are designed  to remove  or lessen  the threat  of systemic
instability.
If  prudential  regulation  is  the  codification  of public  policy  towards  banks,
banking  supervision 5 is  the  government's  means  of  ensuring  the  banks'  compliance
with public policy. By  providing timely and  accurate information,  bank
supervisors  play  a critical  part  in supporting  the  government's  role  as lender
of last  resort,  deposit  insurer,  and/or  investor  of last  resort  when financial
instability  threatens  the economy.  Lacking  such information,  public  policy-
makers  may  make  faulty  decisions  in  response  to  a  problem,  potentially  worsening
it.  The  more  decision-makers  know  about  a  problem,  the  more  likely  is  the  chance
that  confidence  in  the  system  will  be maintained  or restored  through  effective
and  timely  action.  Bank  supervisors  can  provide  this  vital  information  and the
means  to  prevent  and  correct  unsafe  and  unsound  banking  practices.
PUBLIC  POLICY  GOALS  FOR  BANKING  SUPERVISION
Public policy towards banks can differ from country to country. In many
countries,  banks  are used a- a means to achieve  important  developmental  and
social goals through  programs  such as rural branching  and priority  sector
lending.  However,  these  goals  often  conflict  with prudential  concerns  for  the
safety  anc.  soundness  of the banking  system.  Balancing  different,  and often
conflicting,  goals  can  be difficult  at  best.  Such  differences  in  public  policy
are  also  embodied  in  perceptions  concerning  the  proper  role  of  bank  supervisors.
In Turkey,  for  example,  a major  role of the  Board  of Sworn  Bank  Auditors  had
been,  until  recently,  determining  tax  compliance  for  the  iiscal  authorities.  In
many centrally planned economies such as  China, India, and Yugoslavia,
supervisors  have  had  to  enforce  compliance  with  credit  quotas  and  targets  under
a  national  credit  plan.  Bank  supervisors  may  also  be  called  on  to  enforce  foreign
exchange  control  regulations,  check  reserve  computations,  and  ensure  compliance
with  directed  credit  programs.
Conflicting  goals  and the lack  of a well-defined  prudential  role for  bank
supervision  can  only  detract  from  its  effectiveness  in  ensuring  a  safe  and  sound
banking  system.  In most industrialized  countries,  public  policy  goals  tend  to
be more  clearly  defined  and  better-balanced.  While  desirable  social  objectives
such  as  consumer  protection  may  be embedded  in  public  policy  goals,  emphasis  is
usually  directed  towards  the  protection  of depositors,  monetary  stability,  and
an efficiet,t  and  competitive  financial  system.
4  Prudential  regulation  refers  to the  set  of laws,  rules,  and  regulations
which  is designed  to minimize  the  risks  banks  assume  and to ensure  the  safety
and  soundness  of  both  individual  institutions  and  the  system  as  a  whole.  Examples
include  lending  limits,  minimum  capital  adequacy  guidelines,  liquidity  ratios,
etc.  These  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  later  in  the  paper.
5  Banking  supervision  refers  to  the  banking  agency's  ongoing  monitoring  of
banks  and  enforcement  of banking  regulations  and  policies.
2BOX  1:  PUBLIC  POLICY  IN  THE  U.S.
The  Office of  the  Comptroller  of  the Currency, the supervisor of
nationally-chartered  banks  in  the  U.S.,  lists  the  following  public  policy
objectives  for  banking  supervision:
a)  To  prevent  undue  concentration  of  economic  power  and  promote  competition
in  banking  markets;
b)  To  moderate  banking  instability  and  protect  the  public  against  the  worst
consequences  of instability;
c) To encourage  and promote  a high level of operating  efficiency  and
innovation  in  banking;
d) To meet the needs of the public  for conveniently  available  banking
facilities  and  services;
e) To encourage  and  promote  a  high level  of efficiency  and  equity  in the
allocation  of credit  to  various  sectors  of the  economy;  and
f)  To promote  an equitable  distribution  of costs  and  benefits  among  the
management,  stockholders,  creditors,  and  customers  of  banks.
Note  that  the  prevention  of individual  bank  failures  is  not  a goal  of  U.S.
public  policy  toward  banks.  Instead,  it  is  the  health  and  stability  of the
system  which  is the  principal  concern.
For  banking  supervision  to  be  effective  then,  the  role  of  bank  supervision  must
be  clearly defined and understood  by  public policy-makers.  In  addition,
supervisors  must enjoy the support  of government  officials  and the banking
industry  and  political  interference  must  be held to a minimum.  When required,
high  ranking  government  officials  may  need  to  exhibit  the  courage  and  political
will  to  undertake  strong,  and  possibly  radical,  actions  to  preserve  the  integrity
of the  financial  system.  To achieve  these  ends,  government  officials  need to
understand  clearly  the  linkages  between  macroeconomic  performance  and  the  health
of  the  financial  system.  In  addition,  they  will  need  to  demonstrate  the  foresight
to  put  aside  short-term  benefits  for  the  long-term  good.  Banking  supervision  will
not be effective  unless  government  officials  at the  highest  levels  support  a
strong  and active supervisory  process and the public  policy role of bank
supervision  is clearly  defined.  Assuming that these  preconditions  are met,
actions  can be taken to strengthen  the institutional  framework  to achieve
effective  bank supervision  and  a  healthy  banking  system.
CREATING  AN EFFECTIVE  FRAMEWORK  OF PRUDENTIAL  REGULATION
A  broad  body  of  banking  legislation  is  essential  to  ensure  that  bank  supervisors
can  carry  out  and  enforce  their  responsibilities.  In  most  countries,  the  legal
3framework  applicable  to  banks  encompasses  prudential  laws  and  regulations,  the
laws  governing  commercial  transactions  and  debt  recovery,  and  bankruptcy  laws.
When  an appropriate  framework  does  not  ex,st,  it is  a significant  contributor
to  financial  sector  problems.
PRUDENTIAL  REGULATION
Prudential  regulations  establish  the  outside  limits  and constraints  placed  on
banks  to  ensure  the  safety  and  soundness  of the  banking  system.  They  are  the  key
elements  to prevent,  limit  or stop the  damage  caused  by poor management.  The
establishment  of  an  appropriate  regulatory  framework  is  essential  to  ensure  that
government  supervisors  can carry  out and enforce  their  responsibilities.  The
absence  or  weakness  of  prudential  regulation  in  certain  areas  takes  on critical
proportions  and  could  lead  to  banking  failures  and  systemic  instability.
The  manner  in  which  prudential  regulations  are  implemented  can  have  a  profound
effect  upon  the  financial  marketplace,  possibly  leading  to  fragmentation  of the
fin&ncial  markets.  Care  must  be taken  to implement  the  rcgulatory  framework  in
a  manner  which  is  not  distorted  but  which  provides  adequate  protection  to  ensure
a safe  and  sound  financial  system.  For  instance,  it  may  be appropriate  for  all
banking  institutions  in a country  to be subject  to the  same  banking  laws  and
supervision  in order to create  a competitive  market.6  This is particularly
important  as a financial  system  develops  and becomes  more integrated  with the
international  financial  system.  There is a need to harmonize  regulation  with
international  standards  and create a level playing field so that domestic
institutions  can  compete  effectively  and  prosper  both  home  and  abroad.
Broad  authorities  are  needed  to deal  with troubled  financial  institutions,
incompetent  or abusive  managements,  insider  or related  company  abuses, and
concentrations  of credit.  Bank supervisors  should  have the ability  to enact
specific  regulations  under  broader  powers  granted  by the  law-making  body in  the
country.  In  this  way,  the  regulations  can  be easily  amended  to reflect  changing
conditions  through  regulatory  action  rather  than  new  banking  legislation.
Notwithstanding  the  necessity  of an appropriate  regulatory  framework,  it is
important  to recognize  that  regulation  cannot  preclude,  nor should  it  attempc
to  preclude,  every  improper  or ill-advised  banking  practice.  Nor  can  regulation
and supervision  prevent all bank failures. However, good regulation  and
supervision  can  serve  to  minimize  the  adverse  impact  of  moral  hazard  and  relative
price  shocks  upon  the  financial  system.  This  section  reviews  the  principal  types
of  regulations  required  to  ensure  the  establishment  of  a sound  financial  system
and  the  problems  caused  by their  absence.
Criteria  for  Entry
Since  newly-licensed  banks  are  particularly  vulnerable  to failure,  the  initial
6  For  example,  regulations  that  impose  restrictions  on  branching  and  bank
mergers are often motivated by political considerations.  In addition to
fragmenting  banking  systems,  such regulations  limit the ability  of banks to
diversify  their  risks  and  thus  increase  the  fragility  of  banking  systems.
4decision  to  grant  a license  is  an important  one.  In  making  this  decision,  bank
supervisors  should  have  the  ability  to  screen  access  to  ownership  and  management
to  prevenit  individuals  lacking  professional  qualifications,  experience,  financial
backing,  and sound  ethical  standards  from  obtaining  a banking  license  either
through  de  novo  entry  or  acquisition  of  an existing  institution.  Unfortunately,
in  many  developing  countries,  licenses  are  granted  by agencies  of  the  government
other  than  those  with  direct  supervisory  responsibility.  Often  the  granting  of
licenses  is  politically  motivated  and  a  form  of  patronage  or  is  designed  to  serve
a  special  interest  group,  e.g.,  agriculture  or  housing.  Where  this  has  occurred,
problems  and  banking  insolvency  have  often  followed.
In  many  countries,  comm"ercial  and  industrial  conglomerates  attempt  to  establish
banks  to ensure  their  access  tQ preferential  or subsidized  credit.  In others,
special  purpose  banks  created  outside  the  banking  laws  under  various  government
ministries  have  led  to  distortions  in  the  financial  marketplace  caused  by  credits
granted  to priority  sectors  at  heavily  subsidized  interest  rates.  To eliminate
or reduce  these  distortions  and  abuses,  all  decisions  concerning  licensing  and
other  corporate  activities,  such  as  mergers  and  acquisitions,  should  require  the
satisfaction  of  specific  criteria  prior  to  approval  by the  supervisory  authority.
For  example,  for  de novo ent-y,  regulations  should  address  the  minimum  amount
of capital,  the  qualifications  of management,  the  development  of a reasonable
bus'ness  plan  and  projections,  and  the  financial  strength  of  the  proposed  owners.
Failure  to  meet  the  minimum  criteria  or to  present  reasonable  projections  should
result  in  the  denial  of  a  banking  license.  The  establishment  of  specific  criteria
which must be met reduces  the potential  for political  interference  in the
licensing  process.  The ease  or difficulty  of complying  with such  criteria  can
be used  as a  means  of regulating  new  entrants  into  the  marketplace.  To further
reduce  political  interference  or the influence  of special interest  groups,
decisions  regarding  licensing  should  be  delegated  to  the  supervisory  unit  as  one
of its  normal  operating  functions.
Capital  Adequacy
Capital  is necessary  to absorb  unusual  losses.  In most developing  countries,
financial  institutions  are significantly  undercapitalized  and in many cases
stated  capital is negative - - even before portfolio  and other losses  are
recognized.  The regulatory  framework  often lacks  meaningful  minimum capital
adequacy  guidelines  and  the  ability  to impose  restrictions  on  dividend  payments
when  the  bank  is  incurring  losses.  As  a  result,  capital,  as  a  cushion  for  unusual
losses,  is  simply  not  sufficient  for  the  risks  which  exist  both  on and  off the
balance  sheet.  Lacking  adequate  capital,  the  banks'  potential  for failure  is
greatly  enhanced.  Because  banks  are  undercapitalized,  management  is  often  forced
into hiding  losses  that would  make insolvency  apparent.  Wit  .Out  appropriate
action  by bank managements,  government  officials,  and  bank supervisors,  this
unhealthy  situation  may  continue  until  the  banks  face  a  liquidity  crisis  and  the
government  is  forced  to  act.
In  some  countries,  government-owned  banks  operating  with  inadequate  or  negative
capital  are particularly  vulnerable.  Government  officials  and the  public-at-
large  may believe  that  because  of government  ownership,  there  is  no danger  of
failure.  In such cases,  management  often lacks the discipline  which would
otherwise  be required  in  managing  a  privately-owned  institution.  A common  result
5BOX  2: THE  AMERICAN  SOUTHWEST
Banks in Texas and Oklahoma  provide  examples  of the risks involved  in
concentrating  credit  to a  particular  industry.  Banks  in  these  states  were
primary  lenders  to  borrowers  engaged  in  oil  and  gas  production,  oil  field
services,  oail  refining,  and  other  related  activities.  In  addition,  a  large
proportion  of  their  lending  activities  dep  ted  upon  the  success  of  the  oil
industry.  For example,  residential  and commercial  real estate  lending
depended,  to a large extent,  on the employment  generated  by the oil
industry  and  the  favorable  business  climate  the  energy  sector  created.  When
oil prices  were high, the banks in the Southwest  were among the most
profitable  in the  United  States.  However,  following  the  decline  of oil
prices  at the  end  of 1982  and  thereafter,  the  economy  of the  entire  region
was adversely  affected  and the  banks  sustained  significant  losses.  These
losses  resulted  in  the  failure  of  several  of the  nation'  - leading  regional
banks  including  First  City  National  Bank,  Houston,  Texas,  Interfirst  Bank,
N.A  Dallas,  Texas,  and  First  Republic  Bank,  N.A.,  Dallas,  Texas.  Similar
rC.  s  occur  in  the  developing  countries,  particularly  where  the  economy
,rly  diversified  or dependent  upon  only  a few  commodities.
is  that  losses  multiply  at  much  higher  rates  than  in  privately-owned  banks  with
the losses  eventually  absorbed  by the fiscal  budget.  The ensuing  distortions
impact  both economic  development  and  financial  intermediation.
To combat these problems,  minimum capital adequacy  guidelines  should  be
established.  In countries where banks' internal  systems are weak,  these
guidelines  may  be expressed  as a percentage  of total  assets.  A level  not less
than  5-8%  should  be the  absolute  floor.  However,  this  percentage  may  need  to  be
increased  on a case-by-case  basis  due to a bank's  particular  risk  profile  or
where  substantial  off-balance  sheet  risks  exist.  In  countries  where  accounting
and  management  information  systems  in banks  are  more sophisticated,  it may  be
appropriate  to adopt  the  risk-based  capital  adequacy  guidelines  formulated  by
the  Basle  Committee  of  Bank  Supervisors.  In  either  case,  the  components  of  what
constitutes  capital  should  be clearly  defined.  Dividends  should  not  be  permitted
if  the  minimum  capital  percentage  is  not  met.  Given  that  the  purpose  of capital
is to absorb  unusual losses,  the measurement  of capital  adequacy  should  be
related to the areas of greatest  risk, i.e.,  assets and off-balance  sheet
contingencies.  Therefore,  a  minimum  capital  adequacy  guideline  based  on assets
is to  be preferred  to  one  based  on deposits.
Asset  Diversification
Banks  can increase  their  -turns or reduce  their  risks  or generally  achieve  a
better combination  of  r  ..  and return by  diversifying  their operations.
Restrictions  on geographical  expansion  or on product diversification  often
increase  the  exposure  of  banks  to  particular  risks. From  the  prudential  point
of view, such restrictions  should  not  be condoned. However,  lending  limits,
investment  limits,  and other  exposure  limits,  which  prevent  the  concentration
of risk  in  a single  borrower  or  a related  group  of  borrowers,  are  necessary  for
prudential  purposes.  Such limits  are normally  expressed  as a percentage  of a
6bank's  capiral.  In high income  countrien,  credit  to any one borrower  cannot
normally  exceed  15%  or 20% of capital.  In some  developing  countries,  lending
limits  do  not  exist.  In  other-,  t..e  limits  are  established  at imprudent  levels,
in some  cases  exceeding  100%  of a bank's  capital.  In such  instances,  just  one
large  problem  borrower  can render  the  bank insolvent  if the  borrower's  loaas
become  uncollectible.  Fearing  this  eventuality,  bank  management  loses  control
of  the  credit  relationship  to the  borrower  and  may  become  involved  in  deception
to  avoid  recognizing  a problem  situation.
While  many  developing  countries  have  adopted  lending  limits,  these  limits  are
often  circumvented  by  borrowers  who  borrow  through  nominees.  Therefore,  banking
regulations  should  specify  rules  for  combining  loans  to the  ultimate  user of
credit.  These  rules  would  combine  loans  extended  to  a  group  of  related  borrowers,
to  borrowers  exhibiting  a common  source  of repayment,  or in  which  the  proceeds
of loans  can  be shown  to  have  been  used  by or for  the  benefit  of one  party.
A  lending limit of 15% of  the bank's capital is generally considered
reasonable.  In  no event  should  the  maximum  lending  limit  exceed  25%  of  a  bank's
capital.  To accommodate  large  borrowers,  a mechanism  should  be in place to
syndicate  cr sell  participations  in the  credit.  In such  cases,  the  purchasing
bank should  conduct  its  own  credit  evaluation  and  must  assume  the  full  credit
risk for its share. Lending limits  should  normally  apply equally to both
unsecured  and secured  credit,  except  where readily  marketable  collateral  is
obtained  and  properly  pledged.  Examples  of such  collateral  include  government
securities  and  bank  certificates  of deposit.
Many argue  that  lending  limits  impose  an  unwarranted  constraint  on banks  in
capital-short  economies  or on indigenous  banks in  systems  where  foreign-owned
banks are dominant.  Notwithstanding  these  concerns,  the failure  to abide  by
reasonable  prudential  limits frequently  results in banking insolvency  and
systemic  distress.  The costs  of bank failures  invariably  outweigh  the short-
term  constraints  imposed  by lending  limits.  By imposing  a reasonable  lending
limit,  bank supervisors  will  be sending  a strong  message  that  banks  must  have
sufficient  capital  to attain  a scale  of operations  which  will permit  them to
compete  effectively  and  serve  their  large  customers.
Loans  to Insiders
A frequent  cause  of loan  problems  is  credit  granted  to  bank insiders  and  other
connected  parties.  Such  credit  may  not  meet  the  same  standards  as that  extended
to outside  borrowers  and the amount  of credit  often exceeds  prudent  levels.
Invariably,  the  close  linkages  result  in  losses.  Therefore,  limits  on loans  to
insiders, including large shareholders,  and  related companies should be
established.  These  limits  should  not  only limit  the  amount  of credit  extended
but should  also  require  that  the  terms  and  conditions  of such  credits  not  be on
more favorable terms than credit extended to similarly situated outside
borrowers.
Permissible  or Prohibited  Activities
Prudential  regulations  in some  countries  do not  adequately  define  permissible
or  prohibited  activities.  As  a  result,  banks  may  engage  in  commercial  activities
7BOX  3:  CONNECTED  LENDING
Connected  lending is the extension  of credit to individuals  or firms
connected  through  ownership  or  the  ability  to  exert  control,  whether  direct
or indirect.  Examples  of  connected  parties  include  a firm's  parent.  m.ajor
shareholders,  subsidiaries,  affiliated  companies,  directors,  and  executive
officers.  Firms  are  also  connected  where  they  are  controllee'  by the  same
family  or group.
In  Spain,  connected  lending  to  the  Rumasa  Group  led  to  widespread  distress
among  a  large  number  of  banks.  The  Rumasa  group  was  a  holding  company  which
owned  twenty  banks  and  more  than  700  other  companies.  The  banks  were  used
to  finance  many  of the  connected  firms.  When  the  loans  to  these  firms  went
bad,  a number  of the  banks  became  technically  insolvent.  In the  aftermath
of the  crisis,  it  was  discovered  that  some  400  of the  firms  were  phantom
companies  created to borrow  money,  hide the use of loan proceeds,  and
maintain  the  appearance  of financial  health.
The experience  of Spain  is  not unlike  that  of many developing  countries
where  ownership  links  with  commercial  firms  and  connected  lending  have  led
to  preferential  treatment,  abuses,  and,  ultimately,  portfolio  losses  for
banks.  This  occurs  because:  1) the  loans  to connected  companies  are  made
according  to less rigorous  criteria  than those to similarly  situated
outside  borrowers;  2)  excessive  credit  is  frequently  extended  in the  form
of loans  and  investments  because  of  the  parental  or  affiliate  relationship
between  the  bank and the companies;  3) the managerial  attitudes  of the
related or subsidiary  companies  deteriorate  because of  the easy and
systematic  access  to  credit;  4) the  bank's  representatives  on the  related
or subsidiary  companies'  boards  develop  close  relationships  with  the  firms
and the  people  they  are supposed  to supervise  and, as a result,  become
obstacles  to  information  and  control;  and  5)  the  bank tends  to  prop-up  or
support  a  connected  company  which  is  in  trouble  rather  than  recognizing  the
subsidiary  or related  company  as a  problem  borrower.
To preclude the problems  of connected  lending,  procedures  should  be
established  to ensure  that  borrowing  firms  are treated  at arms  length  as
if  they  are  ordinary  third  parties,  ownership  is  scattered  among  a number
of parties,  proper  internal  controls  and  credit  limits  are  in  place,  and
concentrations  of credit  are  avoided.
or enter lines of business  which are unsuitable  for financial  institutions
because  of the  risks  involved  and  the  specialized  expertise  required.  A subtle
example  is  Turkey  where  some  banks  speculate  in  real  estate  by  purchasing  office
buildings  which  far  exceed  their  banking  needs.  In  other  countries,  banks  engage
in activities  which are clearly non-financial  such as  the ownership of
manufacturing  firms  by  many  Latin  American  banks.  The  lack  of  clear  definitions
for  permissible  and  prohibited  activities  increases  the  risks  banks  assume  in
their  quest  for  profits  and  growth.
Regulations  should  detail,  therefore,  the  permissible  activities  for  banks,
8or,  conversely,  prohibited  activities.  Such  r6gulations  should  address  whether
banks can engage in commercial  activities,  own equity  stakes in firms or
enterprises,  and  participate  in  non-banking  financial  activities.
Asset  Classification  and  Provisioning
One  of the  most  serious  deficiencies  in  developing  countries  is  the  failure  to
recognize  problem  assets  through  classification,  provisioning,  write-off,  and
interest  suspension.  In  a  majority  of  cases,  banks  simply  do  not  identify  problem
assets,  establish  realistic  provisions  for  potential  losses,  write-off  or fully
provide  for  actual  losses,  or suspend  interest  on non-performing  assets.  As a
result,  the  balance  sheet  does  not  reflect  the  bank's  actual  condition  and  the
income  statement  overstates  profits  upon  which  dividends  and  taxes  are  paid.  In
many  cases,  if  all  losses  were  formal'ly  recognized,  the  banks  would  be  insolvent.
Bank supervisors,  in the  course  of their  on-site  examinations,  may identify
problem  assets  but are  frequently  powerless  to require  banks  to  make adequate
provisions,  direct  the  write-off  of bad assets,  and cause the suspension  of
interest  on  non-performing  assets  for  lack  of the  necessary  legal  powers.  As a
result,  widespread  abuses  often  continue  unchecked  and  defer  the  recog!Litiun  of
financial  system  distress  unt  it reaches  nearly  uncontrollable  proportions.
Frequently,  it is only  when the  level  of non-performing  assets  gives  way to  a
liquidity  crisis  that  a  government  is  able  to  mobilize  the  political  support  and
the  resources  necessary  to deal  with the  Iroblems  which  have been allowed  to
accumulate.  If  problem  assets  were  approprietely  identified  and  potential  losses
provided  against  in a timely  manner,  actions  could  be taken  to strengthen  or
collect  the  problem  assets,  to  prevent  additional  advances  to  problem  borrowers,
and to reflect  upon and change  lending  policies  leading  to  problems  with the
effect  of containing  actual  losses  at a  controllable  level.
There is a need, therefore,  for  banks to systematically  and realistically
identify  their  problem  assets  and  provide  adequate  reserves  for  possible  losses.
One  way  to  accomplish  this  is  for  developing  countries  to  introduce  regulations
which require  banks:  1) to classify  their  assets  as to quality  according  to
specific  criteria, 7 2) to define  non-psrforming  assets, 8 3) to require the
suspension  of interest  and reversal  of previously  accrued  but uncollected
interest on  non-performing  assets, 4)  to  preclude the  refinancing or
capitalization  of interest,  and  5)  to  mandate  minimum  provisions  to  the  reserve
for possible  losses  based on the classification  of assets.  The percentages
established  for  provisions  may  in  some  sense  be  arbitrary.  However,  on  balance,
they  will establish  some  discipline  in  the  credit  process  and  force  the  banks
to  more  accurately  reflect  their  actual  state  of affairs.
7  Many countries  use categories  called  substandard,  doubtful,  and loss;
however,  the titles  are  not as important  as the  conceptual  process  of grading
actual  and  potential  risk.
8  A frequently  used  definition  defines  non-performing  assets  as  those  which
are ninety days or more past due and not well-secured  and in process of
collection.
9BOX  4: STRUCTURING  LOANS
In a generic  sense,  there  are five  basic  ways in  which  loans  are  repaid:
1) asset  conversion  where  inventory  is converted  to receivables  and then
to  cash;  2)  cash  flow;  3)  refiL  ncing;  4)  sale  of  a  fixed  asset;  and  5)  new
equity  or debt  financing.  For  a typical  going  concern,  the  first  two  ways
are  the  normal  methods  of repayment.  Short-term  loans  for  working  capital
purposes  are  paid  from  the  conversion  of  inventory  to  receivables  to  cash.
For  example,  a toy  retailer  may  wish to stock  up on inventory  before  the
holiday  season  and  is  granted  a  note  with  a  ninety  day  maturity.  During  the
holiday,  the  inventory  is  sold  for  cash  or on  account.  After  the  holiday,
the  accounts  receivable  are  collected  and  the  retailer  repays  the  working
capital  advance.
Term  loans  are  normally  paid  from  cash  flow.  For  instance,  a  manufacturing
concern  wishes  to  install  new  machinery  in  its  factory.  It  obtains  a term
loan for the  purchase  of the  equipment.  The loan is then  structured  to
repay  over several  years  from the  cash  flow  generated  by the  firm.  Note
that  the  loan  payments  should  require  repayment  at  a  rate  that  exceeds  the
depreciable  life  of the  equipment.
When loans are structured  improperly or where they are based upon a
speculative  event  such  as  the  sale  of  a  fixed  asset,  credit  risk  is  greatly
increased.  In  many  developing  countries,  where  there  is  an  absence  of  long-
term sources of  funding and  appropriate  lending instruments,  banks
frequently  lend  short-term  through  vehicles  which  may  not  be appropriate
for long-term  purposes.  An example  is the  case of Turkey  where current
account  advances  represent  two-thirds  of the loans  made by the banking
system. Current  account advances  should  be used for self-liquidating
working  capital  needs.  But,  because  of  high  inflation  and  the  lack  of  long-
term funding  for  bank loans,  these  advances  are used for machinery  and
equipment,  vehicles,  plant  expansion,  and  other  term  requirements.  By  using
the  current  account  to extend  credit  for  these  purposes,  supervision  and
enforcement  of repayment  becomes  significantly  more problematical  and
credit  problems  ensue.
Submission  of False  Financial  Information  By Borrowers
In  many  countries,  the  quality  of financial  information  submitted  to  banks  for
the purpose of obtaining credit is frequently  poor and, in some cases,
intentionally  incorrect  or incomplete.  If  banks  are  to  become  more  prudent  and
sophisticated  in  their  management  of  credit  risk,  they  must  base  credit  decisions
on  a  borrower's  ability  to  repay.  This  ability  is  determined,  to  a large  extent,
by  an  analysis  of  financial  information  submitted  by the  borrower.  To strengthen
the  position  of  banks  in  obtaining  sound  financial  information  upon  which  to  base
their  credit  decision,  regulations  should  make it illegal  for a borrower  to
submit  false  financial  information  to  obtain  a loan.  This  would  provide  a  means
of recourse  within  the  legal  system  through  which  banks  could  pursue  damages.
Scope,  Frequency,  and  Content  of the  Audit  Program
10External  audits serve  as a means  to  independently verify  and disclose  the
firsncial  condition  of  the bank or enterprise  audited.  However, in some
countries,  external  audits  of banks are  not required.  In others,  audits  are
performed  but  tnere  are  no  clear  guidelines  concerning  the  standards  to  be  used,
the  scope  and  content  of  the  audit  program,  nor  the  frequency  of  audit  activities
to  be  carried  out.  Where  audit  standards  do  exist,  they  may  differ  substantially
from  recognized  international  standards  and practices.  Frequently,  audits  are
carried  out in accordance  with local  customs,  tradition,  and  practices.  This
leads  to  inadequate  and  misleading  financial  statements  that  fail  to  accurately
portray  the  true  condition  of  the  institutions.  In  point  of  fact,  there  are  many
examples  of banks having clean audits even though they are known to be
technically  insolvent.
The  weaknesses  in  bank  auditing  standards  and  practices  may  require  an  active
role on the part of bank supervisors  to establish  minimum  standards  for the
scope,  frequency,  and content  of the audit  program  as well as the form and
content  of financial  d,sclosures  based  on such  audits.  Depositors,  investors,
and creditors  of a bank should  have reliable  and timely  information  to make
informed  decisions  when  transacting  business  with  a  bank.  Regulations  governing
the  scope  and  content  of financial  statements  provide  a  means  for  disseminating
information  that  is  complete,  timely,  and  uniform,  thus  permitting  comparison,
informed  decision-making,  and  market  discipline.
Therefore,  regulations  should  empower  bank supervisors  to  establish  auditing
standards  and  minimum  disclosure  requirements.  Key  elements  of  the  audit  program
should  include  an examination  of portfolio  quality  and standards  for  valuing
assets,  establishing  reserves  for losses,  and treatment  of interest  on non-
performing  assets.  In  addition,  supervisors  should  have  the  power  to appoint  or
dismiss  auditors.  Auditors  should  also be under  an affirmative  obligation  to
inform  the  supervisors  of significant  findings  in  a timely  manner.  This  can  be
done  in  a  manner  which  respects  the  bank's  right  to  know,  except  where  criminal
acts  are  involved.
Enforcement  Powers
Bank  supervisors  can  usually  impose  fines  and  penalties  for  criminal  acts and
violations  of  specific  statutes.  However,  there  may  be very  little  they  can  do
to address  unsafe and unsound  banking practices  that are not specifically
addressed  by statute.  In  such  instances,  their  options  very  often  are  to  cancel
the  banking  license  or to  do nothing  --  neither  of  which  is acceptable.  As the
result,  the lack of intermediate  enforcement  powers  often leads  not only to
inaction  on the  part  of  bank  supervisors  but  to  a perpetuation  of problems  and
abuses  within  a given  institution.
In countries  where  the  legal  systems  are  more developed,  there  are  a number
of intermediate  actions  which can be taken.  These include  a full range  of
enforcement  powers  to  deal  with  incompetent  or  abusive  ownership  and  management
including:  1) the  ability  to  remove  management  or  directors;  2)  monetary  fines
or  penalties  which  can  be  assessed  against  individuals,  as  well  as  institutions,
for criminal  acts or violations  of the banking  regulations;  3) civil money
penalties  which  can  be assessed  against  individuals  for  en-aging  in  unsound  and
11unsafe  banking  practices;  4)  the  right  to  restrict  or  suspend  dividend  payments;
5) the  ability  to  withhold  branch  or other  corporate  approvals;  6) cease  and
desist  authority;  and  7)  the  ability  to  impose  financial  liability  against  bank
directors  for  losses  incurred  due  to  illegal  acts  carried  out  by the  bank,  e.g.,
violations  of the  lending  limit  which  result  in loss.
Cease and desist orders put the power of the legal system behind the
supervisors  in requiring  changes in unsafe,  unsound,  or abusive  practices.
Banking  legislation  does  not  need  to  limit  or  prohibit  the  specific  activity  that
is  the  focus  of supervisory  concern.  However,  any  willful  violation  of  the  cease
and  desist  order  is  accorded  the  same  legal  rtatus  as  a  violation  of  a specific
statute  and is subject  to civil or criminal  remedies  in the legal system.
Supervisors  should  also  have the  authority  to issue  temporary  orders  to cease
and  desist,  pending  confirmation  by the  legal  system,  so that  the  bank  will  be
forced  to stop  imprudent  or abusive  practices  immediately.
The ability  to impose  joint and several  personal  financial  liability  upon
directors  for  losses  arising  from  illegal  acts  committed  by  the  bank  is  designed
to encourage  greater  involvement  by a bank's  board  of directors  in actively
supervising  the affairs  of the bank and to guard against  potential  abuses
committed  by the  directorate.  Directors  should  take an active  interest  in the
bank's  affairs  and insist  on proper  controls  and reporting  so that they may
remain  sufficiently  informed  to carry  out their  responsibilities  in a prudent
manner.
Treatment  of Problem  and  Failed  Banks
In  many  developing  countries,  banks  are  subject  to the  same  bankruptcy  laws  as
normal  corporations.  Therefore,  the  bank  supervisors  lack  the  authority  to  close
a  bank,  appoint  a receiver,  and  liquidate  or  merge  it  'n  an  appropr'iate  fashion.
Instead,  the  bank  must go through  a normal  bankruptcy  process,  initiated  by a
depositor  or creditor,  which  may  take  months  or  years  to  complete.  As a result,
depositors  may  not have  access  to their  monies.  In addition,  shareholders  may
retain  an interest  in their  shares.  This effectively  prevents  any attempt  to
recapitalize  the institution  or transfer  ownership  to the government  or new
investors.
Legislation  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  permit  supervisors  to declare  banks
insolvent,  close banks, and place them in receivership  outside the normal
corporate  bankruptcy  process.  This is necessary  if supervisors  are to protect
depositors'  interests  and ensure  public  confidence  in their  ability  to  handle
financial  distress  in  an  orderly  and  efficient  manner.  As part  of  this  process,
supervisors  will also need broad powers to remove  and replace management,
eliminate  the  interests  of  shareholders,  and  purchase,  sell,  or  transfer  problem
assets.
Deposit  Insurance
Many countries  operate  deposit  insurance  or deposit  protection  schemes  as  part
of  their  prudential  regulatory  frameworks.  Participation  in  such  schemes  is  often
compulsory.  The  primary  objectives  of  deposit  insurance  schemes  are  to  avert  bank
runs  and  protect  the  stability  of the  banking  system.  However,  such  schemes  may
12also serve  to protect  small  depositors,  thus promoting  competition  by small
banks. Under certain circumstances,  deposit insurance  schemes may act as
catalysts  for  improving  the  system  of  prudential  regulation,  strengthening  the
effectiveness  of bank supervision  and streamlining  the machinery of bank
restructuring.
However,  deposit  insurance  suffers  from  the  problem  of  moral  hazard  that  may
affect  bank  owners  and  bank  depositors  as  well  as  bank  supervisors.  In  countries
with inadequate  and ineffective  supervision,  deposit  insurance  may provide  a
false  sense  of securitiy  and lead  to the taking  of imprudent  and  unacceptable
risks.  The  establishment  of  deposit  insurance  schemes  must  be  assessed  on  a  case
by case basis  taking  account  of the administrativc  capabilities  of different
countries,  the  structure  of  the  banking  system,  the  sophistication  of  depositors,
etc. Deposit insurance  can take many different forms;  however, questions
pertaining  to the  design  of deposit  insurance  schemes  are  not  addressed  in  this
paper.
COMMERCIAL  LAW,  DEBT  RECOVERY,  AND BANKRUPTCY
In  addition  to  prudential  regulations  designed  to  ensure  the  safety  and  soto  dness
of the  banking  system,  there  is  another  important  aspect  of the  legal  framework
which affects  banks. This is the body of commercial  laws and regulations
governing  a  bank's  contractual  relationship  with  its  customers.  A  key  aspect  of
this  legislation  that  often  causes  problems  for  the  banks  is  that  involving  debt
collection  or recovery.  In  many  countries,  the  commercial  law  dealing  with  debt
collection  and  recovery  overwhelmingly  favors  the  banks'  borrowers.  Foreclosure
and  other  legal  actions  involve  a cumbersome  legal  process  that  may take  years
to complete  at great expense to the banks. This cumbersome  process is a
disincentive  to  banks  to take  strong  action  to  collect  their  problem  debts.  It
may also encourage  bankers to lend additional  funds to carry the problem
borrowers  in the  hope that  the  borrowers  may recover  and  pay  off their  debts.
All too often,  though,  the borrowers  are unable to recover and the losses
incurred  by the  banks  multiply  to even  greater  levels.
If banks  are to remain  viable,  the  legal  system  must  be able to  balance  the
rights  of banks  to foreclose  on collateral  with the  rights  of individuals  and
firms  so  that  debts  can  be  recovered  in  a  timely  manner.  This  may  require  changes
in laws  governing  commercial  transactions  and  bankruptcy  and a wide range  of
actions  to improve  the effectiveness  of the legal  system,  e.g.,  hiring  more
judges  and  establishing  courts  specifically  designed  to  hear  commercial  law  and
bankruptcy  cases.  Experts  in  commercial  law,  debt  recovery,  and  bankruptcy  should
be consulted  for  specific  actions  on  a case  by case  basis.
BUILDING  AN EFFECTIVE  FRAMEWORK  FOR  BANK  SUPERVISION
An ineffective  legal  framework  may result  in  banking  system  distress  but,  more
often than not, lack of enforcement  and supervision  are equally  at fault.
Supervisory  problems  may be rooted in conflicting  public policy goals for
supervision,  political  interference,  a lack of political  will to deal with
problems,  organizational weaknesses such  as  understaffing, inadequate
13compensation,  poor  leadership,  and  divided  supervisory  responsibilities,  and  the
lack  of a  clear  view  on the  role  of supervision.  Problems  may also  result  from
examination  methodologies  which focus  on technical  compliance  with laws and
regulations  or  which  are  diluted  by responsibilities  for  non-prudential  concerns
such  as  tax  compliance,  foreign  exchange  controls,  and  special  lending  programs.
In  some  cases,  problems  also  occur  because  of  the  lack  of  an  early  warning  system
and  offsite  surveillance  capabilities.  More  often  than  not,  though,  supervisory
problems  result  from  a combination  of these  factors.
BANK  SUPERVISION  MODELS  IN  THE INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES
Bank supervision  in the industrialized  countries  developed in response  to
financial  crises,  economic  events,  and  political  phenomena.  Very  often,  the  form
of  bank supervision  reflected  philosophical  and  social  differences  in the  role
of government  and  in the  organization  of society,  e.g.,  the  "clubby"  approach
in  19th  century  Britain,  where  the  Bank  of  England  exerted  its  moral  authority
and leadership  through  "nods and winks", versus the strongly  populist  and
confrontational  tradition  of the  United  States,  which  was  based  on  more  or less
detailed  "rules  of  the  game"  and  required  a  more  elaborate  mechanism  for  ensuring
compliance  with these  rules.  These  differences  were embodied  in two  principal
models  of  bank regulation  and  supervision:  an informal  approach  that  relied  on
consultation  and  moral  suasion;  and,  a  formalized  approach  which  required  active,
"hands-on"  verification  through  on-site  inspection.  In continental  Europe,  a
legalistic  approach  was developed  that  was less  "hands-on"  than in the  United
States  and  delegated  much  of the  verification  and  inspection  of  bank  records  to
external  auditors.
Bank  Supervision  in  Britain
The informal  approach  to bank supervision  is  best  exemplified  by the  approach
taken  by Bank  of  England.  In  Britain,  supervision  was  traditionally  carried  out
by the  Bank of England  in consultation  with  banks.  Moral  suasion,  discretion,
and  personal  contact  were the  principal  tools  of bank supervisors.  Each  bank
had  an individual  relationship  with the  Bank  of  England.  Banks  made  prudential
returns  but, unlike  other  systems  of supervision  where  examiners  conduct  on-
site examinations  to verify  and extract  information,  the responsibility  for
passing  on information  to the  Bank of England  rested  solely  with the  banks. 9
For many years this system  worked relatively  well in a highly  concentrated
banking  industry.  However,  the  system  came  under  stress  when  the  number  of  banks
increased  as  a  result  of  the  creation  of  so-called  secondary  banks  and  the  influx
of foreign  banks  in the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s.
The flaws  of the informal  system,  which  relied  on information  provided  by
management  but without an  independent  assessment  of  the quality of bank
portfolios  and  of the  adequacy  of provisions  for  possible  loan  losses,  became
apparent.  Gradually,  the  British  authorities  adopted  a  more  legalistic  approach
to bank regulation  and supervision  which  brought  British  practice  closer  to
9  Chris  Blackhurst,  "What  Lurks  Behind  UK  Bank  Supervision?",  International
Financial  Law  Review,  February  1985,  pp.  4-10.
14continental  European  practice.  Following  the Johnson  Matthey  affair' 0, which
precipitated  a reappraisal  of the  supervisory  approach  of the  Bank  of England,
the  British  authorities  effectively  delegated  on-site  inspections  to external
auditors  by strengthening  the  reporting  requirements  of  banks'  auditors  to the
Bank of England.  Steps  were also taken  to improve  the off-site  surveillance
capability  of the  Bank  of England.
For the informal  approach  to be effective,  the  UK experience  would  seem to
suggest  that  several  key  conditions  must  exist:  a  small  number  of  banks,  a  strong
central  authority,  a tradition  of close cooperation  between  government  and
industry  as  well  as  close  personal  relationsbips  between  bankers  and  supervisors,
a highly  skilled  work force,  effective  management  systems  within the  banks
themselves,  strong  auditing  and accounting  practices,  and full  disclosure  to
ensure  market  discipline.  Even then,  dishonest  or fraudulent  management  could
deceive  bank supervisors  and  cause  irreparable  damage  to  an institution.  This
system  of informal  supervision  left  a  legacy  of  "hands-off"  bank  supervision  in
many former  British  colonies,  which  made  them  ill-prepared  for  the  problems  of
banking  in  a  developing  environment.  While  this  does  not  appear  to  have  created
difficulties  in  some  countries,  problems  have  emerged  in  many  other  Commonwealth
countries  in Africa  and  Asia where  indigenous  banks  were promoted  to compete
against  the  hitherto  dominant  role  of foreign  banks.
Bank  Supervision  in  Continental  Europe
The  model  of  bank  supervision  found  in  continental  European  countries  is  based
on a legalistic  approach  that  stipulates  various  ratios  that the  banks  must
observe  but  delegates  the  on-site  examination  of  banks  and  the  verification  of
their  records  to  external  auditors.  In  Belgium,  special  auditors  are  appointed
and  paid  by the  authorities.  In Switzerland,  the  auditors  are licensed  by the
Federal  Banking  Commission  and are subject  to special  statutory  duties.  In
Germany,  general  auditors  perform  the  examinations  of  banks  and  must  inform  the
authorities  if  they  discover  facts  which  justify  the  qualification  of  an audit.
However,  supervisors  retain  the  right  to examine  a  bank's  books  and  carry  out
examinations  at any time.  In each of these  countries,  the supervisors  have
established  detailed  rules  concerning  the form and content  of the auditors'
reports.
Delegating on-site bank  examinations  to  external auditors effectively
represents  the  privatization  of the inspection  process,  although  under  strict
government  rules  and  guidelines.  There  are  several  advantages  to  this  approach.
Auditing  firms  may  escape  the  resource  and  salary  constraints  that  often  prevent
supervisory  authorities,  and  governments  generally,  from  employing  and  retaining
highly  skilled  staff.  Moreover,  auditors  may achieve  operating  economies  by
combining  a  prudential  inspection  with  ordinary  accounting  audits.
However,  this  approach  also  raises  some  concerns.  There  are  risks  that  if  not
properly  structured  and controlled,  auditors  may be placed in potentially
10  For  a discussion  of the  Johnson  Matthey  Bankers  affair  and  the  role  of
the Bank of England,  see "How the Bank of England Failed the JMB Test",
Euromoney,  February  1985,  pp.  49-56,  by Will  Ollard  and  Nick  Routledge.
15BOX 5:  THE  COLONIAL  LEGACY  IN  AFRICA
During  Africa's  colonial  period,  many  banks  operated  in the colonies  as
branches;,  subsidiaries,  or affiliates  of major European  banks.  It was,
therefore,  possible  for  colonial  governments  to  carry  out  bank  supervision
in  a  manner  similar  to that  at  home.  Like  many former  British  colonies,
the  laws  and  regulations  governing  banking  in  countries  such  as  Ghana,
Nigeria,  and  Kenya  are  today  roo.ted  in  the  legal  systems  inherited  from  the
British  colonial  governments.  One  feature  of these  systems  is that  banks
are  incorporated  under  the  provisions  of a  companies  act,  subjecting  them
to the  same  bankruptcy  proceedings  that  apply  to  other  corporations.  This
has  caused  cons'.derable  problems  for  prudential  supervisors  since  the  power
to  quickly  intervene  in  insolvent  banks  is  lacking.
Another  legacy  of the colonial  period  is the  emphasis  by some banks  on
secured  real  estate  lending.  Reliance  on real  estate  collateral  afforded
some protection  against  losses  that  would otherwise  have occurred  had
reliance  been placed on other forms of collateral  or on unreliable
financial  informat-on.  However,  the belief  that real estate  collateral
afforded adequate protection against loss  also  led  to  dangerous
concentrations  of credit  to small groups  of borrowers,  in some cases
exceeding  a  bank's  capital.  In  some  sense,  the  preoccupation  of relying  on
real  estate  as collateral  has  acted  as a constraint  on the  development  of
modern  credit  principles,  which  focus  on  cash  flow  and  the  asset  conversion
cycle,  and the  development  of the  accounting  industry.  In addition,  the
distribution  of  wealth  and  economic  growth  has  been  constrained  since  only
the  land-owners  possessed  the  collateral  necessary  to  borrow.
As  a  result of  relying too  much  on  collateralized lending and
insufficiently  on  basic  project/credit  evaluation,  many  banks  in  these  and
other  developing  countries  are  now burdened  by large  portfolios  of non-
performing  assets.  Although  the  amount  of  losses  may  ultimately  be limited
if  the  mortgages  are  adequately  perfected  and  the  collateral  realized,  the
banks  are,  nonetheless,  saddled  with  non-earning  assets  that  will affect
their  operating  profits  for  some  time  to come.  If their  economies  are  to
grow  and  prosper,  banking  practice  in  developing  countries  must  go beyond
collateral-based  lending  to  embrace  modern  credit  principles.
Simply  stated,  the  legal  framework,  supervisory  capabilities,  and  banking
practices  of many former  colonies  following  independence  failed  to keep
pace  with change.  Positive  actions  now  being  taken  by these  countries  to
modify  their  supervisory,  legal,  and  accounting  infrastructure  reflect  a
growing  awareness  of  their  importance  as  integral  components  in  the  process
of financial  reform.
conflicting  roles  with dual loyalties  to both the  banks and the government,
particularly  in  cases  where  the  auditors  are  permitted  to  undertake  other  work.
In addition,  there  is a concern  that,  in their  efforts  to control  costs  and
maximize  profits,  auditors  may  not  devote  sufficient  resources  to  ensure  proper
performance  of the  audit.
16The appropriate  modality for  on-site  inspection,  i.e.  supervisors  or auditors,
for any particular country ultimately depends on an evaluation of which group
is best  able  to perform  the on-site  verification  function. Factors  to be
evaluated  include  skills,  competence,  experience,  and  independence  from  political
and uther influence.  This evaluation is  best performed on a case-by-case basis.
Bank Supervision in the United States
Bank  supervision in the United States exemplifies the formal approach to
supervision that requires an active, on-site presence  to verify conditions
existing  within  banks.  In the  U.S.  model,  periodic  on-site  examinations  have  been
the cornerstone of the supervisory process. The American approach is justified
by the large  number of small  banks and  on unit  banking  within particular states,
both of which result from restrictions on geographic expansion. Whereas the
concentrated  banking systems of the European countries internalize  most of the
costs of policing branches and losses are dispersed at the branch level, in the
American banking !.tructure,  policing  costs are incurred  to a  much greater extent
by the regulatory agencies, while bank losses are covered to a greater extent
through formal deposit insurance schemes." 1 This creates greater social and
political pressures for a hands-on approach to bank supervision.
Unlike  countries  where  the  authorities  rely  on  outside  experts,  bank
supervisors in the U.S. must themselves possess the skills to evaluate asset
quality and other areas of a bank's activities. A major disadvantage of this
approach is that it can be labor intensive and can be inhibited by budgetary
constraints. U.S. supervisory agencies have responded to resource constraints
in  recent  years by targeting  on-site  examinations,  making greater  use of  offsite
surveillance and early warning analysis, and taking advantage of advances in
computer  technology.  These  steps  have permitted  the  supervisory  agencies to  hold
the number of examining staff relatively  constant despite the growth in assets
and growing complexity of the financial system.
The more than  14,000  banks supervised  by U.S. regulators  is  a  major reason  that
a formal  approach  to  supervision  has  been required.  It  also  explains  the  adoption
of the CAMEL rating system and the use of the  Uniform Bank Performance Report.
The  CAMEL  rating  quantifies  a  supervised  institution's  condition  in  five  critical
areas  and  assigns  an  overall  composite  rating,1 2 while  the  Uniform  Bank
Performance  Report (UBPR)  is a statistical  analysis of bank performance that is
based on data from  quarterly  prudential reports. This report compares and ranks
each  bank  against  its peers.  There are  25 peer  groups, bringing  together
institutions  with similar characteristics.  These reports are  publicly available
and the computer tapes  are  made available to  stock analysts  and others.  By using
this technology, supervisors  also  have the ability to prepare ad-hoc reports or
to download data into microcomputer models where simulation or forecasting is
11  See Dimitri Vittas: "The Complementary and Competitive Interaction of
Financial Intermediaries  and  Markets",  CECFP,  World Bank,  inimeo,  September  1989.
12  CAMEL is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management,
Earnings, and Liquidity, asset and liability  management.
17performed. In the latest stage of technological advance, expert systems, i.e.,
artificial  intelligence, are being  used  to  analyze prudential  reports  and
generate written comments.
Harmonization and Converegence of Bank Supervision
Despite the differences in supervisory  approaches, there is a growing consensus
that bank  supervision  and  regulation should be  harmonized  across  national
boundaries  due  to  the  ever-increasing global  interdependence of  financial
markets. In  a  world  where financial  transactions  occur  around the  clock  and  banks
enter into financial transactions  with any number of foreign  correspondents and
counter-parties,  the  global  financial  system  may only  be  as strong  as its  weakest
links. Differences in regulation can distort the financial markets as well as
increase the risks for banking activities performed beyond national borders.
There is also a danger that domestic institutions  operating abroad may escape
supervision.
The  failure of  the West German Bankhaus  Herstatt  in 1974 due to  foreign
exchange and other losses had damaging effects on the international interbank
market and focused attention on the need for greater international supervisory
cooperation. This led to the formation of the Basle Committee later that year
under  the  auspices  of  the  Bank  for  International Settlements. This  forum
comprises  banking supervisors from the  Group of  Ten13 countries  plus Switzerland
and Luxembourg. Following its creation, the committee addressed the issue of
supervision of  financial  institutions operating abroad by  developing broad
guidelines to ensure that no institution  escaped supervision. These guidelines
are  contained  in  the  "Basle  Concordat", which  embodied  the  following  key
principles:
1) supervision of foreign  banking establishments is the joint responsibility of
parent and host authorities;
2) no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision;
3) supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of the host
authorities;
4) supervision of solvency is essentially a matter for the parent authority in
the case of  foreign branches  and primarily  the responsibility of  the host
authority in the case of foreign subsidiaries;  and,
5) practical cooperation should be  promoted by  the exchange of  information
between host and parent  authorities and  by the  authorization  of  bank inspections
by or on behalf of parent authorities  on the territory of the  host authority. 1 4
13  The Group of Ten countries are: Belgium,  Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and United States.
14  Richard Dale, "Issues in Bank Supervision Around the World", The World
of Banking, September-October 1982, p.16.
18Other  important  initiatives  prompted  by  the  work of  the  Basle  Committee include
recommendations that supervision of banks' international  business be conducted
on  a consolidated basis,  so  that risks can be evaluated  globally, and  the
adoption  of risk-asset  based capital  adequazy  standards.  Continuing  work focuses
on banks' exposure to country risk, liquidity and interest rate risk, and off-
balance sheet risk.15
The growing integration of financial  markets, especially among member states
of  the  European  Community,  has  led  to  a  convergence  of  systems  of  bank
supervision.  It  is  now  widely  accepted  that  an  adequate  system  of  bank
supervision should  allow for both off-site surveillance  and on-site inspection.
The task of off-site supervisors is to analyze the reports submitted by the
banks, identify possible problems, and propose remedies. After receiving the
banks'  prudential  returns,  the  off-site  analysts  should  check  their  completeness,
accuracy, and ^onsistency, as well as compliance with prudential ratios and
regulations. The  finar.-ial  situation and  significant  trends  or  changes  in
financial ratios of reporting banks should be analyzed. Thereafter, a summary
should be prepared for the management of the supervisory agency. This summary
should go beyond the numbers to explain the reasons or causes for declining
trends, unsatisfactory performance, or unusual  items. Where  necessary,  the
analysts should recommend action with the objective of providing early warning
of future  problems. Information from prudential returns should also be used to
compile analytical and statistical reports that contrast the performance of
individual banks to their peer groups and which assist the supervisors to in
tracking  performance of the banking industry generally.
On-site  inspectors  should  verify the  accuracy  of  the  periodic  reports  submitted
to the supervisory agency and analyze those aspects of a bank that cannot be
adequately monitored by off-site surveillance. Inspectors should focus on the
banks' i,Lain  activities and on the potential problems identified by off-site
surveillance.  In  particular,  they  should  assess  the  quality  of  assets,
management, earnings, capital, and funds management, as well as  the bank's
internal control, audit, management information, and accounting systems. In
evaluating  asset  quality,  the  inspector should  review  the  bank's  lending
policies, written or  implieci,  to determine whether  they are  reasonable and
complete. Thereafter, he should examine the credit files  of  large  borrowers,
problem borrowers, and a sample of files belonging to smaller borrowers, to
assess the quality of the loans, management's credit practices, and adherence
to credit policies. Minutes of meetings of the credit committee and the board
of directors should be reviewed. The inspector  should also evaluate the bank's
procedures for suspensing the accrual of interest,  writing off bad debts, and
determining an adequate loan loss provision.
A more fundamental task of bank supervisors is to review the business and
strategic  plans  of individual  banks and to  assess the  capabilities  of management
to fulfill objectives. They should also check that management systems in place
are sufficient to ensure compliance  with policies and are functioning properly.
15  Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Report on
International Developments in Banking Sunervision, Report number 5, September
1986.
19Bank supervisors should also encourage banks to establish and strengthen their
own internal management systems as the first lines  of defense against unsound
unsafe, or illegal  banking practices.  Management systems should include  written
policies  and  procedures,  formalized  planning  and  budgeting,  managemernt
information systems,  internal loan review, compliance systems, internal and
external  audit activities, and internal  controls.  The development of management
systems should be encouraged in both  large and small banks, although  th,eir
sophistication and complexity may differ.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
Political Interference
The basic models for bank supervision  provide some guidance as to the for,  bank
supervision should take in a particular country. Ilowever,  no model wi l1  be
effective if  significant  political interference  is  permitted. In  many  count-ies,
it is not ur sual for the  head of a ministry to place a phone call to a Lanker
with instructions to  make a loan to a  particular individual  or firm.  Similarly,
it is  not atypical for  an influential  individual  to  use  his influence to  prevent
effective enforcement by supervisory authorities. The Philippines during the
Marcos rule was an extreme example  where bank supervisors, though competent and
well-trained, could not take appropriate action against certain banks and bank
managers for rear  of reprisals.  Interference  in  banking  matters at that  time  was
said to have originated at the  highest levels of government.
Lack of Political  Will
Closely linked  with political interference  is the  lack of political  will to deal
with problems. Even in cases where bank supervisors  have adequately identified
problems in banking institutions, follow-up and enforcement by their superiors
and higher  level government officials has  often been  inadequate. There  are
several reasons for this. For one, the problems may appear insurmountable and
government  officials and policy-makers genuinely  lack the knowledge and ability
to  deal  with  the problems.  Secondly,  the problems  may  require  short-term
adjustment.  Policy-makers  may forego  the  long-term  benefits of strong  action for
short-term political expediency and leave the problems for a future government
administration.  In some cases, the supervisory staff  may lack strong leadership
and may not bring the problems to the attention of higher level officials. In
other cases, government officials and bank supervisors may not recognize the
extent of distress in the system and the implications this holds for economic
development. Regardless of  the reasons, inaction in the face of widespread
distress  leads to  mounting losses  and further  deterioration in  the  health of the
financial system.
ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
Bank supervision  is often  placed under the  umbrella  of a country's central  bank.
Since the function of bank supervision is to ensure a safe and sound banking
system  and to  prevent financial  system instability,  the central  bank, as  manager
of a country's  monetary policy and lender  of last resort, is a logical place to
house banking supervision. However, there is  no compelling evidence to suggest
that operating from within the central bank affords a distinct advantage over
20the  creation  of  an  autonomous  supervisory  agency  provided  that  bank  supervision
is  insulated  from  political  influences,  information  derived  in the  supervisory
process is shared  with those managing  monetary  policy,  and the agency is
adequately  funded  --  either  through  assessments  or direct  budget  allocations.
In fact, some argue that an agency  which is solely responsible  for bank
supervision  will devote  greater  attention  to the  fulfillment  of its  role  than
one  which  also  has  responsibilities  for  managing  the  nation's  monetary  policy.
On the  other  hand,  there  is an argument  that  where  supervisory  responsibility
is  centered  in  a  central  bank,  it is  likely  to  be exercised  with  a  wider  degree
of discretion  than where the primary  supervisory  agency is autonomous  and
operates  within  defined  statutory  limits. 16
In general,  in countries  that have strong  central  banks, it would seem
inappropriate  to  dilute  their  influence  and  authority  by assigning  supervisory
responsibilities  to  another  institution.  If  the  central  bank is  weak,  then  the
case for an independent  supervisory  agency  is stronger.  In many high income
countries,  the  division  of responsibilities  reflects  historical  factors.
A third  alternative  is  to  place  the  supervisory  agency  within  the  Ministry  of
Finance  or  Treasury.  In  most  countries,  this  alternative  is  the  least  desirable
since  these  ministries  tend to  be highly  politicized  and the  coordination  of
policy  with  other  government  agencies  tends  to  b6 problematic.
Ultimately,  it would  seem  that  the  effectiveness  of a bank supervisory  body
depends  not so much on its  organizational  location  but on its leadership  and
independence  from  political  influence.  If  a  particular  institutional  arrangement
in a given country  permits the bank supervision  unit to operate free from
inappropriate  outside interference,  that arrangement  is probably the most
desirable  for  that  country.
Regardless  of where supervision  is located  within government,  there are
important  organizational  steps  that  can  be taken  to  enhance  its  effectiveness.
The  bank  supervision  unit  should  possess  its  own  identity  on  at  least  a  par  with
other  important  units  within  the  central  bank  or ministry  or as an independent
agency.  The director  of bank supervision  should  be a high ranking  government
official  and  report  directly  to  the  central  bank  governor  or deputy  governor  or
the minister of finance or treasury.  This is necessary to establish  an
appropriate  degree  of credibility  with the  banking  industry  so that  directives
issued  by the  supervisor  will  have  effect.
Supervisory  Responsibilities
The  responsibilities  of  the  bank  supervision  unit  should  encompass  both  on-site
and  off-site  supervision.  These  should  not  be split  between  different  agencies
as is the  case  of Turkey  where  the  Board  of Sworn  Bank  Auditors  is  responsible
for on-site examination  and the Central Bank of Turkey conducts  off-site
surveillance.  In such cases,  communication  and coordination  difficulties  may
occur  and supervisory  priorities  may differ.  The  division  of responsibilities
16  Richard  Dale,  "Issues  in  Bank  Supervision  Around  the  World",  The  World
of Banking,  September/October  1982.  pp. 14-24.
21affects  the supervisor's  ability  to  prioritize  and  focus  supervisory  concerns
and  corrective  action  where  it  is  needed  most.
Responsibilities  for non-prudential  concerns,  such as tax collection  and
compliance  with currency  controls  and  credit  constraints,  should  be held to  a
minimum.
Staffing  and  Compensation
In most developing countries,  bank supervisors  face resource  and budget
constraints.  As a  result,  supervisory  units  are  often  understaffed.  This  affects
the supervisor's  ability to conduct bank examinations  and perform other
supervisory  duties.  The  most capable  and  qualified  individuals  are frequently
employed  in the private  sector  or in other  activities  where compensation  is
greater.  In some  cases,  compensation  for  bank supervisors  may  not  be as great
as  for  other  parts  of  government  even  though  the  responsibilities  may  be  greater.
This  affects  the  supervisor's  ability  to  attract  and  retain  qualified  staff.
Needless  to say, adequate  staffing  for bank supervision,  both in terms  of
quantity  and skill  levels,  is a must.  To attract  and retain  qualified  staff,
compensation  should  be  competitive  within  government  and  with  the  private  sector.
Governments  frequently  argue  that  they  cannot  afford  additional  staff  or  higher
salaries.  Nor can they justify differentiated  salaries  within government.
However,  there  is an argument  to the  contrary  that governments  cannot  afford
banking  crisis  and  its  debilitating  effects  upon  economic  growth  and  development.
It should  be noted that there  are precedents  for banking supervisors  to be
exempted  from  normal  civil  service  guidelines  and  salary  scales.  Further,  the
cost  of  even  one  bank  failure  may  far  exceed  the  costs  incurred  in  employing  and
retaining  competent  staff,  a  situation  clearly  demonstrated  by the  U.S.  savings
and  loan  crisis  when  requests  for  additional  staff  were  denied  by the  government
administration  then  in  power.
Career  Path
In  some  countries,  bank  supervision  is  not  viewed  as a  career  and  employees  are
rotated  in and out of the bank supervision  unit in on].y  a few years.  This
contrasts  with countries  such  as the  U.S.  where  bank superviiors  require  about
five  years  just to learn  the  skills  necessary  to examine  sw.ll,  well-managed
institutions.  If  bank supervision  is to  be effective,  it muss-  be considered  a
full-time  career  option.  Career  paths  and  job  descriptions  sht,uld  be developed
to provide meaningful  and challenging  responsibilities  as well as upward
mobility.  This could include career  milestones  such as promotion from an
assistant  examiner to a  full fledged examiner  to a  senior examiner and,
ultimately,  into the ranks of management.  Rotational  assignments  in other
departments  could be accommodated  as a means of broadening  an individual's
knowledge  and  skills.  However,  it  should  not  mean the  end  of  a career  as  a  bank
supervisor.
Training
Training  is often  conducted  solely  on-the-job  in  a less  than  systematic  manner
so that  skills  are  acquired  in a  hit-or-miss  fashion.  Inadequacies  in training
22and  development affect  the  supervisor's ability to  build  a  skilled,
knowledgeable,  and  competent  staff.  Training  programs  should  ensure  that  each
supervisor  receives  not less  than  two  weeks  training  per  year --  more for  new
staff.  This  training  should  combine  formal  instruction,  case  study,  and  seminars.
In addition,  on-the-job  training  should  be ccnducted  in a systematic  fashion.
Senior  staff should  have the opportunity  to mix with supervisors  from other
countries  for  a cross-fertilization  of ideas.
SUPERVISORY  METHODOLOGIES
The ongoing  task of bank supervisors  is typically  to ensure  the safety  and
soundness  of the  financial  system  --  as  opposed  to individual  banks.  Similarly,
the  responsibilities  of  bank  examiners  are  to  depositors,  not the  shareholders
of banks.  Therefore,  supervisory  activities  should focus  on the areas of
greatest  risk  to the  system,  e.g.,  large  financial  institutions  or  banks  whose
activities  may lead  to  contagion  within  the  system.  Supervisors'  tools  include
on-site  examinations  of individual  institutions  and  off-site  surveillance  from
both macro and micro perspectives.  For most developing  countries,  on-site
examinations  are most important.  This is because  problems  of insolvency  in
developing  countries  usually  occur  due  to  credit  losses  which  are  best  determined
while  within  an  institution.  Therefore,  supervisors  must  concentrate  on  assessing
asset  quality  and  mandating  provisions  for  bad  debts  and  suspension  of interest
on non-performing  assets through on-site examination  and verification.  By
determining  asset  quality  and  the  condition  of  an institution,  bank  supervisors
provide  critical  information  to government  policy-makers  on the  health  of the
financial  system.
On-Site  Examinations
On-site  examination  methodologies  frequently  focus  on compliance  with banking
regulations  and directives.  As a result,  prudential  concerns  for safety  and
soundness  are often  overlooked.  Even in cases  where supervisors  attempt  to
address  safety  and  soundness  concerns,  the  examination  process  may  only  provide
a  "snapshot"  of  the  institution's  condition  as  of  a  given  date  without  addressing
potential  risks  and the  management  systems  needed  internally  by the  bank to
control  risk  in  a dynamic,  changing  environment.  For  example,  examiners  may  try
to determine  the  condition  of a  bank's  loan  portfolio  but fail  to evaluate  the
lending  policies  and  practices  leading  to loan  problems  or which  may  give  rise
to future  loan  problems.  Indeed,  in  many  cases,  bank  examiners  fail  to  identify
and  quantify  the  extent  and  severity  of  problem  assets  --  a  major  failure.  Even
when problems  are identified,  supervisors  may lack the powers to require
provisions  and  write-offs  or other  necessary  actions.
To correct  these  weaknesses  and improve  the effectiveness  of their  on-site
examination  activities,  supervisors  need  to  move  away  from  checking  compliance
with laws  to  assessing  risk  and  assisting  banks  in  managing  risk.  To accomplish
this,  bank supervisors  should  embrace  a top-down  approach  which  places  emphasis
on  the  direction  and  policies  formulated  by  the  board  of  directors  and  executive
management.  It  is  not  enough  to  quantify  problems  --  although  this  is  certainly
a  necessary  step.  The  causes  of  problems  must  also  be understood  and  preventive
action  taken  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of their  recurrence.
23In addition,  efficient  use  of scarce  supervisory  resources  should  be made  by
targeting  examination  efforts  of  individual  institutions  to  the  areas  of  greatest
risk,  e.g.,  asset  quality,  interest  rate  risk,  foreign  exchange  activities,  etc.
Examination  activities  should  also avoid  the examination  of each and every
branch  office  or  operating  subsidiary  of  an  institution.  Instead,  the  examination
should  focus  on  the  condition  of  the  consolidated  institution  by examining  those
units  which  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  institution's  overall  position.  The
remaining  units  should  be evaluated  on a sample  basis.
The failure  to follow-up  on problems  and to enforce  corrective  action is
another  common  weakness  in  the  supervisory  process.  This  occurs  for  many  reasons
including  those  discussed  above,  i.e.,  weak leadership,  political  influence,
temerity  in dealing  with problems,  organizational  weaknesses,  and a lack of
appropriate  enforcement  tools.  However,  it also occurs because  examination
results  and  the  type  of  corrective  actions  needed  are  not  adequately  communicated
to  the  bank's  board  of  directors  and  senior  management.  It  is  extremely  important
that  examination  results  are  clearly  communicated  to  the  bank  through  a  written
examination  report  and meetings  with the board of directors  and executive
management.  A transmittal  letter  attached  to the  written  examination  report  and
signed  by the  head of bank supervision  or his designee  should  highlight  the
report's  major  conclusions  and recommendations.  In addition,  the transmittal
letter  should  require  a formal  response  by the  bank  within  a stated  time  frame.
If progress  reports  concerning  corrective  actions  to  be taken  by the  bank are
required,  these  should  be outlined  in the transmittal  letter.  Administrative
procedures  should  be  established  for  monitoring  the  bank's  response  and  verifying
corrective  actions.
In most developing  countries,  written  examination  procedures  are less than
adequate,  or lacking  altogether,  so that  the  examiner  must  rely  totally  on his
experience,  knowledge,  and skills.  This leads to a lack of uniformity  and
consistency  in  the  conduct  of  on-site  examinations  from  one  examiner  to  the  next.
As  a  result,  the  head  of  bank  supervision  can  never  be sure  which  bank  functions
were reviewed  and the  manner  in  which  the  examination  was performed.  The lack
of written examination  procedures  also deprives  new staff of an essential
training  tool.  Therefore,  to  ensure  consistency  and  uniformity,  and  to  provide
a  training tool for  new  examiners,  written examination  procedures and
questionnaires  should  be developed  for  use in on-site  examinations.  These  are
not meant to supplant  the examiner's  judgment.  However,  they do provide  a
framework  and  support  for  the  work  to  be carried  out.
A complementary  aspect  to  written  examination  procedures  is  the  documentation
of  work  performed  and  the  maintenance  of  working  papers.  These  are  necessary  to
demonstrate  that  the  actions  recommended  by the  examiner  are  not  arbitrary  but
are  based  upon valid  concerns  and criticisms.  This documentation  may also  be
necessary  to  support  legal  enforcement  actions  proposed  by the  supervisors.
Over the long  run,  bank supervisors  can  use the  on-site  examination  process
as a catalyst  for changing  the fundamental  ways in which banks operate  by
recommending  actions  for  financial  institutions  to  upgrade  their  operations.  This
usually involves  the strengthening  of management  systems  in banks including
written  policies  and procedures,  formalized  planning  and  budgeting,  internal
24controls  .. nd audit  procedures,  management  information,  and loan review.  The
rationale  for this approach  is that supervisors  will always face resource
constraints.  The  banks  themselves,  therefore,  must  establish  the  first  lines  of
defense  against  unsound  or unsafe  practices.  Once management  systems  are in
place,  supervisors  can determine  that  the systems  are  working  by testing  the
systems.  If the systems  are  inadequate,  the  scope  of an examination  should  be
expanded  so  that  risks  can  be identified  and  quantified.
Off-Site  Surveillance
An off-site  surveillance  capability  provides  an important  complement  to  on-site
examinations  by providing  eatly  warning  of actual  or potential  problems  and  a
means for monitoring  and comparing  financial  performance.  However,  off-site
surveillance  should  not  be  viewed  as a  means  to  replace  on-site  examination  as
the primary form of supervision  in a developing  country.  The quality of
information  and integrity  of data  provided  by banks in all countries  must  be
verified.  In developing  countries,  the quality  of information  is frequently
incomplete  and  inaccurate.  Often,  banks  do  not  have  the  internal  accounting  and
control systems to ensure timely  and accurate  preparation  of information.
Therefore,  in most cases, it would be inappropriate  to rely on off-site
surveillance  as  more  than  a complement  to  on-site  examinations.
In  most  developing  countries,  prudential  reports,  which  form  the  basis  for  most
off-site  surveillance  activities,  are frequently  limited  to those  concerning
liquidity,  reserve  requirement  computations,  and credit  guidelines.  Analysis
often  consists  of  simp'ly  checking  compliance  with  certain  balance  sheet  ratios.
Rarely  is information  gathered  to  meaningfully  appraise  risk.
For off-site surveillance  and early warning analysis to be  effective,
prudential  reports  must  move  awav  from  statistical  inputs,  liquidity  and  reserve
requirement  computations,  and  simple  balance  sheet  calculations  to  inputs  which
permit  the  measurement  of  risk.  This  means  that  supervisors  should  collect  data
concerning  a  bank's  loan  portfolio,  including  delinquencies  and  problem  assets,
foreign  exchange  position,  off-balance  sheet  commitments,  and  other  risk  areas,
as well  as  balance  sheet  and  profit  and  loss  statements.  To  ensure  uniformity,
supervisors  should  have  the  ability  to  prescribe  the  timing,  content  and  format
of the  prudential  returns  so that  comparative  data  can  be prepared  and  used in
a consistent  fashion.
It  is  critical  that  the  off-site  surveillance  function  be  fully  integrated  into
the  supervisory  process  so that  weaknesses  may  be corrected.  In  some  cases,  it
may be sufficient  to contact  the  bank  by phone  or letter  to discuss  concerns
identified  off-site.  However,  in other cases,  it might  be necessary  to send
examiners  into  a  bank  to  follow-up  on  the  weaknesses  identified  through  the  off-
site  surveillance  function.  In  any  event,  information  and  reports  prepared  off-
site  cAn  provide  important  comparative  data  on areas  of risk  and  efficiency  and
should  be used  by examiners  during  their  on-site  examinations.
Inaction  In  Restructuring  Banks
In  the  industrialized  countries,  bank  supervisors  attempt  to  minimize  potential
losses  and  liability  to  the  government  by  closing  banks  near  or  at  the  point  they
25reach  technical  insolvency.  However,  in the  developing  countries,  the  absence
of  reliable  information,  an  inadequate  legal  framework,  and  the  lack  of  political
will  often  permit  banks  to remain  open  and  losses  to  multiply,  even  though  the
banks  may have lost  their  reported  book capital  many times  over.  Inaction  in
dealing  with insolvency  may  also  occur  because  the  institutional  framework  for
dealing with  insolvency  is inadequate.  Experience  indicates that ad hoc
approaches  to dealing  with insolvency  generally  do not succeed.  Because  banks
are  not  closed,  the  effectiveness  of  bank  supervision  may  be  compromised.  Bankers
may  know  that  supervisors  are  powerless  to  take  appropriate  action.  In  order  to
counter  this,  a systematic  approach  and  mechanism  for  dealing  with insolvency
is  necessary.  17
STRENGTHENING  THE  ACCOUNTING  AND  AUDITING  FRAMEWORK
The  development  of a strong  accounting  profession  can  ensure  the  establishment
of uniform accounting  standards  which accurately  and properly  reflect  each
financial  institution's  true  condition.  The  rise of the  accounting  profession
also gives  way to the  preparation  of reliable  financial  information  by which
credit  can  be assessed.  Auditors  play an important  role  by providing  a system
of checks and balances,  making recommendations  to improve accounting  and
administrative  controls,  checking  for  compliance  with laws  and  regulations,  as
well  as fraud,  and  certifying  financial  statements  for  public  disclosure.
However,  in  many developing  countries,  an accounting  and  auditing  tradition
is lacking.  There  may be a shortage  of skilled  practitioners  and, frequently,
a professional  accounting  body does not exist.  In addition,  accounting  and
auditing  systems  and  financial  disclosure  may  be non-existent.  The  effect  is  to
hinder  the  development  of a  well-functioning  financial  system.
A major weaknesses  in bank accounting  and auditing  for many developing
countries is the absence of  adequate  accounting  standards.  Criteria for
determining  non-performing  assets is  subjective,  problem assets are  not
identified  or properly  valued,  interest  continues  to accrue  on non-performing
assets  and,  in  many  cases,  it  is  capitalized  or  refinanced,  and  foreign  exchange
or other  losses  go unrecognized.  These  practices  lead  to inflated  profits  and
overstated  balance  sheets,  often  hiding  technical  insolvency.  Dividend  payout
often  drives  reported  income  and  banks  manage  their  loan loss  provisions  and
write-offs  to  achieve  desired  levels  of  profitability.  Thus,  the  essential  ltnk
between  portfolio  quality  and  the  level  of loan  loss  provisions  is  missing.
In some  countries,  banks  may operate  without  the  benefit  of a uniform  chart
of  accounts,  consistent  terminology,  and  standard  accounting  methodology.  Charts
of  accounts  often  vary  in  structure  and  terminology  and  the  accounting  principles
used  to  determine  account  entries  and  classification  are  inconsistent  from  bank
to  bank.  These  weaknesses  create  distortions  which  make  analysis  and  comparison
difficult.
17  For  additional  information  on  bank  restructuring,  see  Aristobulo  De  Juan:
"Does  Bank  Insolvency  Matter?  And  What  to Do  About  It?",  mimeo,  CECFP,  1988.
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however.  Credit  is extended  to borrowers  without  the  benefit  of current  and
reliable  financial  information.  The  lack  of current  and  satisfactory  financial
information  contributes  to the  perpetuation  of collateral-based  lending  since
lenders  are  not  able  to  appraise  a borrower's  ability  to  rc.ay.
Financial  disclosures  made  by banks  and  enterprises  are  often  misleading  --
if  not  outright  fraudulent.  The  lack  of  reliable  financial  information  inhibits
foreign  investment  and the growth  of the capital  markets.  In the absence  of
reliable  financial  information,  investors  are simply  reluctant  to place  their
funds  at risk.
To deal  with  these  problems,  accounting  standards  and  the  auditing  profession
must  be strengthened.  Standards  which  should  be established  include  guidelines
for  asset  classification,  definitions  for  past  dues  and  non-performing  assets,
prohibitions  against  the  capitalization  or  refinancing  of  interest  which  is  due
and unpaid,  reversal  of previously  accrued  but uncollected  interest  on non-
performing  assets,  adequate  provisions  for  actual  or  potential  loan  losses,  and
guidelines  for  recognition  of foreign  exchange  and  other  losses.
One  way to accomplish  this  is to establish  minimum  standards  as part of the
legal  framework.  Another  way is for  the local  professional  accounting  body to
enact  standards  having  the  force  of law.  In  countries  where  a local  accounting
body  does  not exist  or  where  the  local  professional  body is  very  weak,  actions
will  be necessary  to establish  or enhance  the  role  of a professional  body and
strengthen  the  profession  by providing  training  courses  at both  the  university
and  professional  levels,  encouraging  university  students  to enter  the  field  of
accounting  as a  career,  providing  library  and  research  facilities,  establishing
a  professional  advisory  service  and  peer  review,  and  imposing  sanctions  against
auditors  who  consistent  y  perform  below  acceptable  standards.  In  addition,  public
policy-makers  must  demonstrate  a  commitment  to  supporting  the  industry's  efforts
to  strengthen  its  standards  and  performance.
UPGRADING  BANKS  AT THE  INSTITUTIONAL  LEVEL
The primary  line of defense  against  banking  insolvency  and financial  system
distress  is  neither  bank  supervision  nor  prudential  regulation.  It  is  the  quality
and  character  of management  within  the  banks  themselves.  Therefore,  efforts  to
strengthen  the  financial  system  must  also  focus  on  strengthening  management  and
management  systems  through  a  process  of  institutional  development.  To  begin  this
process,  the initial  step in most cases is to evaluate  the  bank's existing
condition,  e.g.,  strengths,  weaknesses,  threats,  and  opportunities.  Included  in
this step is the identification  and quantification  of problem assets and
potential  or  unrecognized  losses.  Unfortunately,  management  information  and  other
systems  within  many banks  are relatively  unsophisticated  and the quality  of
information  which is available  may be  inaccurate  and incomplete.  Further,
management  is frequently  unwilling  or incapable  to deal  with or recognize  the
bank's  problems.  It is simply  more convenient  to ignore  problems  than  to face
up to them. It may be necessary,  therefore,  to require the audit of the
27institution  by qualified  external  auditors  or an examination  by supervisory
authorities  with a major  goal of determining  asset  quality,  the  single  factor
most  likely  to  erode  capital  and  cause  insolvency.
Once  the  full  extent  of  problems  and  their  causes  are  diagnosed,  solutions  can
be developed.  With portfolio  quality  problems,  the necessary  actions  often
involve  changes  in  management,  a reappraisal  of implicit  lending  policies  and
practices,  and strong  efforts  to collect  or strengthen  problem  credits.  Legal
action  is  often  necessary  to foreclose  or repossess  assets  or to pursue  legal
claims  against  guarantors.  In  extreme  cases,  where  portfolio  problems  have led
to  or threaten  insolvency,  financial  restructuring  and  recapitalization  of the
institution  will  be necessary.18  These  will  normally  require  the  replacement  of
management,  elimination  of shareholders'  interests,  and  carving  out  of the  bad
assets.
After  an institution  has  been returned  to health,  appropriate  measures  must
be taken  to ensure  that it remains  healthy.  The deterioration  in portfolio
quality  is  apt  to  repeat  unless  the  policies  and  practices  leading  to  the  decline
in  portfolio  quality  are  re-appraised  and  modified.  Loan  underwriting  criteria
must  be  reviewed.  Repayment  programs  must  be  established  at  each  loan's  inception
and  enforced.  Credit  should  be  predicated  upon  the  borrower's  ability  to  repay.
Current and satisfactory  financial  information  on each borrower should  be
obtained  and analyzed  on a timely  bLsis.  Concentrations  of credit  should  be
avoided.  Adequate  provisions  should  be  set  aside  for  loan  losses  and  loans  should
be written-off  when they are determined  to be non-bankable.  The accrual  of
interest  should cease on non-performing  assets  and previously  accrued but
uncollected  interest  should  be  reversed.  Interest  capitalization  should  normally
be prohibited.  Realistic past due and non-performing  criteria should be
established.
It  would  be short-sighted,  however,  to evaluate  policies  and  practices  only
in the  context  of past  problems.  Importantly,  policies  and  procedures  must  be
capable  of guiding  the institution  in an ongoing,  ever-changing  environment.
Therefore,  one  approach  to  upgrading  at the institutional  level  starts  at the
top,  with  the  policies  and  objectives  established  by the  board  of  directors,  and
works its way down through  the organization.  This top-down  approach  places
emphasis  on the  board  of directors  and  executive  management.  Unless  their  full
commitment  to the  process  is  obtained,  the  process  of upgrading  over  the  long-
term is likely  to fall far short  of success.  The board of directors  of any
institution  must be shown that it is in their own interests  to prudently
supervise  the  affairs  of the  institution.
THE  ROLE  OF DIRECTORS
The process  of institution  building  should  include  a clear  definition  of the
roles and responsibilities  of the Board of Directors.  They are placed in
positions  of trust  and, though  they may delegate  the day-to-day  routine  of
conducting  the  bank's  business  to  their  officers  and  directors,  they  should  be
la  For the steps  necessary  to restructure  banks  see  Aristobulo  De Juan's
mimeo  draft  on bank  restructuring.
28BOX 6: DUTIES  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES  OF DIRECTORS
To select competent  executive  officers  who are qualified to soundly
administer  the  bank's  affairs  and  to  dispense  with  the  services  of  officers
who  are  unable  to  meet  reasonable  standards  of executive  ability.
To  effectively  supervise  the  institution's  affairs  by  exercising  reasonable
business  judgment  and  competence,  and  by  devoting  sufficient  time  to  become
informed  about  the  bank's  affairs.
To adopt  and  follow  souwd  policies  and  objectives  within  which  the  chief
executive  must  operate.  These  policies  and  objectives  should  include  major
functional areas  such as  investments,  loans, asset  and  liability
managsment,  profit  planning  and  budgeting,  capital  planning,  and  personnel.
To avoid self-serving  practices.  Unwarranted  loans  to a bank's  director
often  have  the  effect  of  significantly  weakening  the  bank's  general  credit
standards.  Directors  who  become  financially  dependent  on  their  institution
normally  lose  their  usefulness  as  directors.
To be informed  of the  bank's  condition  and  management  policies.  In this
regard,  directors  should  employ  an external  auditor  on their  behalf  and
take  an active  interest  in  understanding  the  procedures  to  be  used  by the
auditor  and in  reviewing  the  audit  report  with the  auditors.
To malntain  reasonable  capitalization.  A board of directors  has the
responsibility  of  maintaining  its  institution  on  a  well-capitalized  basis.
To  observe  laws,  rulings,  and  regulations.  Directors  must  exercise  care  to
see that laws, rulings,  and regulations  are not violated. The legal
framework  should  establish  financial  responsibility  for  losses  arising  out
of  negligent  or illegal  actions.
To ensure  the  bank  has  a beneficial  influence  on the  economy.  Banks  have
a  continuing  responsibility  to provide financial  services  which are
conducive  to  well-balanced  economic  growth.  Directors  should  ensure  that
the  bank attempts  to satisfy  all  legitimate  credit  needs.
held accountable  for the consequences  of unsound  or imprudent  policies  and
practices.  Since  the directors  are responsible  for  safeguarding  the interests
of depositors  and  shareholders,  it  is  advisable  that  a  majority  of the  board  is
independent  of  political  interests,  active  management  and  the  interests  of  major
corporate  shareholders.
EXECUTIVE  MANAGEMENIT  AND  MANAGEMENT  SYSTEMS
A  key responsibility  of directors  is to employ  a competent  chief  executive
officer.  Thereafter,  senior  management  assumes  the  responsibility  to  manage  the
day-to-day  affairs  of  the  bank,  to  implement  and  follow  the  framework  of  policies
and  objectives  established  by the  board  of directors,  and  to  employ,  maintain,
29and educate  a qualified  staff.  Senior  management  conducts  the operation  and
administration  of the institution  through  various  management  systems.  These
include written policies and procedures,  internal  controls, loan review,
compliance,  planning,  budgeting,  internal  and  external  auditing,  and  management
information  systems.  Their  effective  implementation  strengthens  the  quality  of
management  decision-making  and  control.
Written  Policies  and  Procedures
To  ensure  that  management executes business plans  and  controls risks
appropriately,  written  policies  should  be formulated  for each  major  business
activity  or function  the  bank  is  engaged  in.  The  policies  and  procedures  should
be comprehensive  and should  provide  a clear  framework  within  which  management
and  staff  can  be expected  to  operate.  Policies  should  be reviewed  annually,  or
more  often  as  needed,  and  should  provide  an  appropriate  mechanism  for  exceptions
when  warranted.
Internal  Controls
A strong system  of accounting  and administrative  controls  is necessary  to
safeguard  assets,  check  the  accuracy  and  reliability  of  accounting  data,  promote
operational  efficiency,  and  encourage  adherence  to established  policies.  Such
internal  controls  should  include  a  plan  of  organization,  procedures,  and  records
that  generate  an accurate  reporting  system  and accountability  for assets  and
liabilities  within  the  organization.
Loan  Review
Since  loans  generally  comprise  the  major  component  of  bank  assets,  there  should
be an effective  program  of internal  loan  or asset  quality  review.  Ideally,  this
analysis  should  be performed  by an independent  loan  review  department  staffed
by credit analysts  who report  directly  to the board of directors,  a board
committee,  or a senior  officer  not involved  in lending.  Their  responsibilities
are to identify  problem  loans  based  not  only on performance  but on financial
statement  analysis,  prepare  summations  to  substantiate  credit  ratings,  determine
compliance  with  lending policies, and  ensure that corrective action is
forthcoming  to  strengthen  or  collect  problem  credits.  The  results  of  the  internal
loan  review  program  are  used  as  a  basis  for  determining  the  adequacy  of the  loan
loss  reserve.  Loan  officers  should  be required  to identify  their  own problem
loans  at early  stages  of deterioration  to supplement  the  loan  review  process.
Compliance
Compliance  systems  are  necessary  to ensure  that the institution  is operating
within  the  constraints  of law.  Compliance  systems  may  operate  parallel  to  or  as
part of an institution's  internal  control  and  auditing  programs.  However,  the
focus is on compliance  with laws,  rulings,  and regulations  rather  than the
safeguard  of assets,  reliability  of information,  operational  efficiency,  or
adherence  to  policy.
Planning
30Planning is fundamental  for effective  management.  Changes in competitive
conditions,  volatility  in the financial  markets,  technological  advances,  and
deregulation  increase  the risks  within  the operating  environment.  Banks  must
continually  reassess  their  activities  and  develop  new  ways  of  operating  to  adapt
to those  changes  and  control  risk.
Budgeting
Budgeting  is important  both as a planning  device  and  as a means  of control.
Budgets  are  usually  prepared  for  a  period  of  one  year.  They  translate  operational
activities  into  quantitative  terms.  The  planning  aspect  involves  the  decision-
making  processes  leading  to  the  budget's  preparation  and/or  subsequent  revisions.
The  control  aspect  involves  the  comparison  of  budgeted  expenditures  and  revenues
versus actual results  and the explanation  of significant  variations.  As a
planning  and control  device,  a  budget  provides  a  benchmark  to measure  results
and  the  adjustmants  necessary  to  meet  performance  objectives.
Internal  and  External  Auditing
Traditionally,  the  primary  objectives  of the  internal  audit  function  have  been
the  detection  of irregularities  and  the  determination  of  adherence  to  the  bank's
policies  and procedures.  However,  in recent  years, the responsibilities  of
internal auditors  have expanded to  include the appraisal of  accounting,
operating,  and  administrative  controls.  This  appraisal  is  intended  to  ensure  that
those  controls  provide  for  the  prompt  and  accurate  recording  of  transactions  and
the  proper  safeguarding  of  assets.  In  addition,  internal  auditors  often  have  the
responsibility  of participating  in the  formulation  of new  or revised  policies
and  procedures.  Such  participation  ensures  that  adequate  safeguards  and  controls
are  provided during the planning and  implementation  process. Additional
responsibilities  of  internal  auditors  may  include  checking  compliance  with  laws,
evaluating  the effectiveness  of administrative  controls  and procedures,  and
evaluating  the  efficiency  of operations,  i.e.,  opera"ional  auditing.19
The  primary  objective  of external  audits  is generally  aimed  at enabling  the
auditor  to  express  an  opinion  on  financial  statements.  However,  external  auditors
can also  assist  management  in establishing  strong  internal  controls,  internal
audit  programs,  and  management  information  systems;  help  banks  develop  operating
policies  and methods  of operations;  provide  greater  assurance  that financial
reports  to shareholders  and the  public  are  accurate  and include  all  necessary
disclosures;  aid  board  members  in fulfilling  their  fiduciary  responsibilities;
and  assist  management  in  conducting  special  studies. 
20
Both  internal and  external auditors must  demonstrate  competence and
independence.  In this  regard,  internal  auditors  should  report  directly  to the
board  of directors  while  external  auditors  should  avoid  any  formal  interest  in
19 Office  of the  Comptroller  of the  Currenc',  Comptroller's  Handbook  for
National  Bank  Examiners,  Washington,  D.C.
21  Office  of the  Comptroller  of the  Currency,  Comptroller's  Handbook  for
National  Bank  Examiners,  Washington,  D.C.
31the  bank  being  audited.
Management  Information  Systems.
To  make informed  decisions,  management  must  have  timely,  accurate,  and  relevant
information  concerning  the bank's loan portfolio,  funding  sources,  foreign
exchange  risks,  profit and loss position,  off-balance  sheet contingencies,
interest  rates,  etc.  Balance  sheets  and profit  and loss  statements  should  be
prepared  at least  monthly,  if  not  more often.  However,  in some  countries,  the
problems  involved  in obtaining  such information  in banks  having  huge branch
networks,  a paper-based  transaction  process,  manual  posting,  and inadequate
communications  can be enormous.  Increasingly,  automation  can be part of the
solution. With the  advent  and  increasing  sophistication  of the  microcomputer,
financial  institutions  in  the  developing  world  have  the  opportunity  to  automate
their  applications  at a relatively  inexpensive  cost.  The productivity  gains,
increased  efficiency,  and  timeliness  of  management  information  should  more  than
compensate  for  the  costs  involved.
BOX  7:  THE  CASE  OF NEPAL
To illustrate  the  problems  of incomplete  management  information,  one  can
look  at the  case  of  Nepal.  Nepal,  as  a developing  country,  lacks  adequate
infrastructure,  i.e.,  roads,  transportation,  communication,  etc.  Because
of this,  it may take  as lons as two  weeks to physically  reach  certain
branches. To consolidate  fVnancial  information  from all of a bank's
branches,  in  the  absence  of  a  Ltomated  systems  and  adequate  communications,
may  take  months  and,  as  the  result,  profit  and  loss  information  and  balance
sheets  may lag  six  or more  months.  In  one  bank,  unreconciled  differences
in interbranch  accounts,  caused  by communication  and  personnel  problems,
have existed  for  several  years  and approximate  the  bank's  capital.  In a
such a situation,  it is very difficult  to produce  timely  and complete
management  information  on  such  important  items  as  past  due  credits,  problem
credits,  new  extensions  of  credit,  and  off-balance  sheet  risks.  This  places
management  in the  position  of not  being  able  to effect  corrective  action
in as timely  a manner  as is necessary.  More often than not, however,
management  information  systems  are  inadequate  even  in  developing  countries
where infrastructure  is good. In such cases, management  is directly
responsible  and  should  be held  accountable.
SOME  CLOSING  THOUGHTS
Well-informed  investors,  depositors,  and  creditors  can  be  an  efficient  regulator
in  an  age  of  technology,  information,  and  free  capital  flows.  However,  financial
disclosure  an'd  market  discipline  may  not  be good  ideas  for  developing  countries
whose  financial  systems  are in  disarray  until  appropriate  safeguards  are  built
into the system. In addition  to strong supervision,  prudential  regulation,
accounting  and  auditing,  and  a lender  of last  resort,  there  must  be a  mechanism
to  deal  with  bank insolvency.
32As the  globalization  of financial  markets  continues,  integration  of domestic
financial  markets  with  the  larger  international  financial  system  will  become  more
important  if  developing  co .tries  are  to  grow  and  prosper.  Therefore,  there  is
justification  for  harmonizing  regulation,  supervision,  and accounting  to the
extent possible  so that distortions  can be minimized.  In some instances,
permitting  foreign  banks  to  compete  in the  domestic  market  may  provide  healthy
benefits  to domestic  banks in terms  of improved  efficiency  and transfer  of
technology  and  management  skills.
Economic  deregulation  and  financial  liberalization  are  important  for  a  country
to develop  a viable  and robust  financial  system.  However,  deregulation  will
remove the protections  previously  afforded the banking system. Increased
competition,  a  changing  price  structure,  new  market  entrants,  and  other  factors
will increase  the risks banks assume.  Unless there is a strong system  of
supervision,  regulation,  accounting  and auditing,  there is a likelihood  of
increased  bank failures  and  financial  system  distress.
The  common  threads  running  through  each  of  these  topics  are  strong  supervision,
prudential  regulation,  accounting  and  auditing.  To  establish  an  effective  program
of  banking  supervision  and  prudential  regulation,  the  public  policy  role  of  bank
supervision  must  be clearly  defined  and  understood.  At the  same time,  actions
to strengthen  the legal framework,  the supervisory  process,  accounting  and
auditing,  and the institutions  themselves  should  commence  on parallel  tracks.
In  most  countries,  it  will  take  years  to  develop  a  truly  effective  institutional
framework.  But  it  is  a  framework  that  must  be  established  if  success  in  financial
sector  reform  is to  be achieved  and  preserved.
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